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Abstract 
 
This article examines Yugoslav national programs of ruling political elites and its concrete 
implementation in education policy in interwar Yugoslavia. It is argued that at the beginning 
of the period Yugoslavism was not inherently incompatible with or subordinate to Serbian, 
Croatian or to a lesser degree Slovenian national ideas. However, the concrete ways in which 
Yugoslavism was formulated and adopted by ruling elites discredited the Yugoslav national 
idea and resulted in increasing delineation and polarization in the continuum of national ideas 
available in Yugoslavia. Throughout the three consecutive periods of political rule under 
scrutiny, ruling elites failed to reach a wider consensus regarding the Yugoslav national idea 
or to create a framework within which a constructive elaboration of Yugoslav national 
identity could take place. By the end of the interwar period, the Yugoslav national idea had 
become linked exclusively to conservatism, centralism, authoritarianism and, for non-Serbian 
elites at least, Serbian hegemony. Other national ideas gained significance as ideas providing 
viable alternatives for the regime‘s Yugoslavism. 
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Introduction 
 
Within the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, historians of Yugoslav national 
identities and nationalisms have been primarily concerned with what Rogers Brubaker has 
termed state-seeking nationalisms (9), focusing on the wide spectrum of national ideologies 
which demanded the reorganization of Yugoslavia‘s political structure and later the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia for the case of their respective nations. Some historians have traced 
the roots of these nationalisms back to ethnic/national identities which had emerged before the 
foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. Accordingly, it was the 
competition between clearly defined and delineated Serbian, Croatian and to a lesser degree 
Slovenian national identities that determined the history of the Yugoslav state. Underlying 
this is an approach that conceives of national identities as clearly bounded and singular 
concepts. They might evolve slightly during a formation process, but after that process is 
completed no more significant alterations occur. In his standard book on Yugoslavia‘s 
national question Ivo Banac for example states:  
 
Yugoslavia‘s national question was the expression of the conflicting national ideologies that have 
evolved in each of its numerous national and confessional communities, reflecting the community‘s 
historical experiences. These ideologies assumed their all but definite contours well before the 
unification and could not be significantly altered by any combination of cajolery or coercion. (406)  
 
Thus, in Banac‘s view, Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian national identities became fixed prior 
to the foundation of the Yugoslav kingdom in 1918. Consequently, the interwar period was of 
no real significance for the national question in Yugoslavia. If anything, according to Banac, 
during that period ―the national movements against centralism – particularly prominent 
among the Croats – merely completed the process whereby each group‘s national 
individuality was firmly set‖ (407). Within such an approach, there can be no place for a 
genuine or viable Yugoslav national idea.
1
 In a recent study Jovo Bakić for example has 
argued that Yugoslavism should be seen as a form of pan-nationalism, subject to competition 
between the different ethnic nationalisms that had developed within the South Slav lands (esp. 
49-50).   
Recently, Dejan Djokić has presented an alternative approach for the study of interwar 
Yugoslav history, arguing that ―interwar Yugoslavia cannot be understood as a simple Serb-
Croat dichotomy (Elusive Compromise 1).‖ Taking Djokić‘s arguments as a starting point, I 
will focus on the Yugoslav national idea as it was defined by ruling political elites during the 
interwar period and argue that it would be too simplistic to reduce it to a merely tactical 
choice to promote a well established and fixed Serbian or Croatian national ideology.
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Instead, this article will examine Yugoslav national ideologies of the ruling political elites as 
an important factor within the dynamics of national identities in interwar Yugoslavia: it will 
contribute to the examination of the period not as an epilogue in the crystallization process of 
national identities, but as a period during which important variations came about in 
conceptions about and relations between national identities.  
Following the dynamic approach toward national identities as outlined by Zimmer and 
Kaufmann, I consider national identity to be ―a public project rather than a fixed state of 
mind‖ (Zimmer 174). According to Kaufmann‘s stimulating optical model of identity, 
national identities are constantly defined and re-defined as the product of the juxtaposition of 
a territorial and human population referent, interpretive lenses and symbolic resources. ―Each 
lens‖ – Kaufmann distinguishes between ideologies, instrumental considerations, social and 
geographic perspectives, and psychological predispositions – ―refracts light from the national 
referent upon certain symbolic resources to create a distinct national identity for each 
individual‖ (473). When individual national identities overlap, elites can codify collective 
national discourses. If these discourses become accepted by wider layers of the population, 
they themselves act as ideological lenses (Kaufmann 466-70). The resulting national identities 
should be seen as dynamic concepts, constantly open to variations, diachronically as well as 
synchronically. 
Within the framework of such a dynamic model, it becomes clear that the formation of 
a Yugoslav state, with all its implications, must have caused variations in discourse and in 
practice within national ideas available in Yugoslavia. As Brubaker makes clear, ―forms of 
nationalism that have resulted from the nationalization of political space are different from – 
and less familiar than – those that helped engender it‖ (4). I will focus on ruling political 
elites and examine in which way they redefined their national ideologies within the context of 
the new Yugoslav state. I will show that they conceived of a Yugoslav nationalization of the 
political and cultural space, i.e. they propagated a specific Yugoslav national identity which 
was to find expression within the Yugoslav state. By focusing on ruling political elites, I do 
not intend to claim that they were all-powerful in constructing national identities. However, it 
is undeniable that they did act as an important factor in the dynamics of national identities in 
interwar Yugoslavia. Indeed, the national ideologies formulated by political elites act as 
fundaments for concrete nation-building policies. Additionally, individuals, as well as 
competing elites formulate their national discourse in a political and cultural space which is 
nationalized along the lines of the national discourse of the ruling elites. Thus, we will see 
that the concrete ways in which Yugoslavism was formulated and adopted by the ruling elites 
was one of the factors which discredited the Yugoslav national idea itself and resulted in 
increasing delineation and polarization in the continuum of national ideas available in 
Yugoslavia during the period. 
I will distinguish between three consecutive periods of political rule in interwar 
Yugoslavia. I will focus first on the period from the unification of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918 to the proclamation of the Royal Dictatorship on 6 
January 1929. I will examine the national discourses of the two leading political parties, the 
Radical Party and the Democratic Party and argue that the Radicals‘ Serb centered, 
compromised Yugoslavism was prevailing. During the Royal Dictatorship, which lasted from 
6 January 1929 until the elections of 5 May 1935, the King and his Council of Ministers 
proclaimed the ideology of integral Yugoslavism as the cornerstone of Yugoslav politics. 
Finally, the government of Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović (May 1935 – February 1939) 
formulated a so-called real Yugoslavism.
3
 It is clear that this article will mainly deal with 
Serbian elites, partly because Serbian politicians were overrepresented in Yugoslav 
governments of the interwar period. More importantly however, as this article will show, 
there was a considerable overlap between Serbian and Yugoslav identities and, more than 
other elites, Serbian political elites remained favorable toward Yugoslavism throughout most 
of the interwar period. The period after the 1938 elections will not be treated. In August 1939 
an agreement was reached between Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković and Croat opposition 
leader Vladko Maček whereby an autonomous Croatian unit was created. During this period 
of political and ideological transformation, Yugoslavism as a national ideology was clearly 
losing ground. Since I am interested primarily in the Yugoslav character of the elites‘ national 
ideas, I will only treat this period in passing. 
For each of these periods I will discuss the national ideology of the ruling political 
elites through an examination of the nationalist elements within their discourse. Apart from 
governmental declarations, programs et cetera, this article will also discuss national ideas as 
they were transmitted through education policy. Because education was considered one of the 
most effective means to nationalize the Yugoslav population, the national ideology of the 
ruling elites can be easily traced in curriculums and education laws. This article does not 
intend to examine how these Yugoslav national ideologies were received by the population at 
large. Rather, it will focus on the top level of the Yugoslav society and argue that although all 
Yugoslav governments during the interwar period adopted some form of Yugoslav national 
ideology as one of the central elements of their politics, they failed to formulate and adopt a 
consistent Yugoslav national idea as a basis for constructive negotiations with other 
representative elites.  
 
The parliamentary period (1918-1929) 
 
During the so-called parliamentary period between the unification of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918 and the proclamation of the Royal Dictatorship on 
6 January 1929, the two dominating political parties were the People‘s Radical Party (NRS, 
Narodna radikalna stranka) and the Yugoslav Democratic Party (JDS, Jugoslovenska 
demokratska stranka). The Radicals were part of 21 of the 24 governments in office. In all but 
one of those governments they provided the Prime Minister. In sum they spent just less than 
10 months in opposition. Before the Democratic Party split up in March 1924, it took part in 9 
of the 12 governments in office during this period.
4
 Although the position of the Democrats 
and the Independent Democrats weakened after the 1924 split, each of the parties still 
participated in four more governments. Additionally, these parties enjoyed the support, 
although not unqualified, of King Aleksandar, who had far-reaching political authority and 
should thus be seen as an important factor in Yugoslav politics.
5
  
Before the unification of Yugoslavia, one of the Radical Party‘s main goals had been 
the liberation and unification of all Serbs (Bakić 298-99).6 Under the changing circumstances 
of the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the formation of the Yugoslav Kingdom in 
1918, they gradually redefined their national ideology toward a compromised Yugoslavism, 
propagating the existence of the Yugoslav nation while at the same time recognizing three 
different parts within that nation. The Radicals considered the Yugoslav nation a so-called 
three-named nation (troimeni narod) consisting of a Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian tribe.
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Different historical developments had led to the formation of these tribes within the Yugoslav 
nation, each with its own characteristics. However, these differences did not harm the national 
unity of the Yugoslav nation and each tribe should be able to preserve its characteristics 
within a larger Yugoslav national unity. Although in official statements the party was quick to 
recognize ―that this state [was] composed out of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and that its 
process and future depend[ed] on the joint work of all three national parts, all three branches 
of our single nation‖ (qtd. in Bakić 344),8 its national ideology remained Serb centered, 
because it was clear for the Radicals that the Serb tribe deserved to take the leading role 
within the Yugoslav nation since Serbs had put most efforts in the unification and liberation 
of the Yugoslav tribes. In the words of Nikola Pašić, the party‘s leader until his death in 1926, 
in a comment on the much disputed constitution of 1921:  
 
When we built this constitution some of us demanded some sort of autonomy for the Croats. Serbia has 
suffered so much for this unification and liberation that it could not agree with that. We didn‘t want 
them to be servants and we masters, but we had to make it clear that we – Serbs – were the ones who 
fought for freedom and made unification possible. (Qtd. in Stanković 265)  
 
The explicit Greater-Serbian character of the following citation from Samouprava is not really 
representative of the more diplomatic discourse of Radical politicians but makes clear how 
vague boundaries between Yugoslavism and Greater-Serbianism could be: 
 
The Serbs came into being – that is, the Serb name, the idea of Serbdom, and the Serb national 
consciousness – after a certain primary tribe, called Serb, separated itself from the other tribes by virtue 
of its number, power, and the intelligence of its elders and leaders, and succeeded in excelling [among 
the other tribes], and distinguishing and uplifting itself. And so the Serb name spread in all directions as 
the original Serb tribe increasingly succeeded in drawing the other neighboring, less powerful, and less 
important tribes into its [political] community.
9
 (Qtd. and translated in Banac 162) 
 
Clearly, the Radicals wanted to preserve Serbian traditions as dominant elements within the 
Yugoslav national identity. Consequently, the Yugoslav national identity which they defined 
relied overwhelmingly on symbolic resources linked to the Serbian tribe. In discussions 
concerning the literary unity of the Yugoslavs the Radicals always favored the Cyrillic over 
the Latin alphabet, claiming that the former was more naturally linked to Serbo-Croatian 
phonetics, that it was a Slavic alphabet whereas the Latin script was foreign (Dimić 1: 191-
98). Another important set of symbolic resources for the Radicals were linked to the Serbian 
state tradition that was to be preserved within Yugoslavia. As Pašić‘s previous quotation 
shows, the Radicals continuously stressed that it was the Serbian state, under the leadership of 
the Serbian dynasty, which fought and suffered most for the Yugoslav state, pointing at the 
fresh memory of the Balkan wars of 1912/1913 and the First World War, the so-called wars of 
national liberation and unification. In a similar way we should interpret their insistence on the 
official name of the new state: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and its language: 
Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian.
10
 These names make clear that the Radicals saw the Yugoslav 
nation as a nation consisting of three tribes, under the leadership of the Serbian tribe.  
The Democrats were, definitely in the first years after the war, much more explicit in 
their Yugoslavism than the Radicals and left a firm mark on the national discourse of the 
period. The party was the fiercest advocate of a Yugoslav nation-state. Important in this 
respect was that JDS was the only truly Yugoslav party, in the sense that it was the only party 
with representatives from all over Yugoslavia, being formed in 1919 out of several pre-war 
parties, most importantly the Croat-Serb Coalition and the Slovenian Liberals from Austria-
Hungary, and the Independent Radical Party from pre-war Serbia (Gligorijević, Parlament 
37-38). In the 1920 party program the integral Yugoslavism of the Democrats was clearly 
formulated:  
 
The Democratic Party considers the Serb, Croat and Slovene people as one national unity by blood, 
language and sentiments, because of the continuity of the lands where it has inseparably lived and by 
the joint vital interests of its national survival. In accordance with such an interpretation of national 
unity and in order to strengthen the national state community for the idea of one Yugoslav nation and 
state, the Democratic Party excludes all historical, tribal, religious and regional differences as reasons or 
fundaments for the political and administrative organization and regional separation [of the country]. 
The Democratic Party will nurse and develop the consciousness of the unity of our people and state 
throughout the widest layers [of the population] and will strive for that unity to come to expression in 
all political, social, cultural and economic questions and to wipe out all deeds of separatism, demagogy 
and poverty of the general social morale. (Qtd. in Čulinović 172) 
 
Contrary to the compromised Yugoslavism of the Radicals, the Democrats saw the Yugoslav 
nation as one and indivisible. The Democratic Party did not leave tribal differences 
unmentioned, but held that they should and would disappear within a very short period of 
time. Contrary to the Radicals, the Democrats insisted that the state should play an active role 
in spreading Yugoslav national consciousness and in wiping out any ―superficial‖ 
 differences (Banac 185-86; Dimić 1: 198-203).  
 However, partly because the political influence of the Democrats decreased throughout 
the twenties, but also because of the general political instability of the period, the integral 
Yugoslavism of the Democrats was never really put into practice before 1929. All official 
declarations and speeches referred to the unity of the Yugoslav tribes and how differences 
between them were only superficial and would disappear within a short period of time, but 
very little was actually undertaken to promote this national rapprochement. The recurring 
debates on education policy are exemplary. Every new minister, Radical or Democrat, started 
his mandate claiming that he would do everything possible to unite the education system, to 
raise children in the Yugoslav spirit as mentioned in the Constitution.
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 A whole range of 
commissions were appointed to unify the education system, but owing to the continuous 
alternation of ministers and personnel in the Ministry of Education few of their proposals 
were ratified before 1929 and Yugoslavia‘s education system remained fractured along the 
pre First World War-borders (Mayer 57-80; Tešić 89-100). The Ministry of Education did 
adopt some unified curriculums, which were clearly intended to spread a Yugoslav national 
identity. According to the curriculums for lower elementary schools especially the history 
courses were intended to arouse national, Yugoslav feelings, by paying attention to the 
common Yugoslav character of the independent medieval kingdoms and the parallel Serbian, 
Croatian and Slovenian attempts toward liberation from foreign rulers.
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 Generally, the three 
tribes were equally represented, although the attention that was paid to the Serbian state and 
its role as ‗Yugoslav Piedmont‘ could be perceived as Serbian dominance (Kingdom of SCS 
―Nastavni program‖ 12-14). A clearer example of the dominance of Serbian symbolic 
resources was the decision made by the Ministry of Edcuation on 22 September 1928 to 
impose St Sava‘s Day as an official school holiday and St Vitus‘ Day as the last day of the 
school year. However, it should be mentioned that the birthday of Josip Strossmayer, a bishop 
and politician in Croatia in the second half of the 19
th
 century famous for his Yugoslav 
orientation, was also established as an official school holiday (Aranicki and Karadţić 160-62). 
Apparently this decree was not properly implemented and the Ministry immediately 
thereafter, on 28 December 1928, issued a special decree warning that the celebration of St 
Sava‘s Day should be conducted in the spirit of religious tolerance and Yugoslav national 
unity, especially in religiously mixed schools (163-64).  
Thus, the ruling elites‘ national ideology of the period inclined toward the Radicals‘ 
Serb centered, compromised Yugoslavism. It was compromised, because tribal differences 
were tolerated. It was Serb centered, because the Serb tribe obviously took the leading role. 
However, it was also Yugoslav, because the existence of a Yugoslav nation was accepted and 
took a very prominent place in the national discourse of the ruling elites, especially in the 
integral Yugoslavism of the Democrats, but also in the compromised Yugoslavism of the 
Radicals. Contrary to scholars who downplay the Yugoslav element in the discourse of the 
period and claim that the national ideologies of the Radicals and the Democrats were tactical 
choices to protect Serbian national interests within Yugoslavia,
13
 in my opinion the 
Yugoslavism of the ruling elites cannot be seen as inherently subordinate to or well delineated 
from clearly defined and established ―narrow‖, in this case Serbian national identities. 
Although regional/tribal/national interests played a role as interpretative lenses in the 
formation process of national identities of the ruling elites, the end product could still be some 
form of Yugoslavism, albeit Serb centered.
14
 Indeed, within the growing body of literature on 
sub-national or regional identities – within the rhetoric of the Yugoslav Kingdom tribal 
identities – it is accepted that: 
 
the region serve[s] as a category of perception, of ―vision and division‖ of the world, just as capable of 
making sense of changes in collective life as [is] the nation – in fact, eminently capable for making 
sense of the nation itself. This perspective enables us to account for the specific forms that national 
identity has taken, which vary from place to place, and to open it up as an arena of conflict and 
negotiation, not coercion and manipulation. (Applegate 1177) 
 
However, because the Yugoslavism of the ruling elites was defined as an exclusively centralist 
and Serb centered concept, there was little place for the necessary cooperation and negotiation 
with representative elites other than the dominant Serbian parties with regard to Yugoslav 
national identity. Whereas at the beginning of the twenties a great majority of the political and 
cultural elites did favor the Yugoslav national idea and were willing to participate in 
negotiations over the concrete definition of Yugoslav national identity, by the end of the 
parliamentary period the viability of the Yugoslav national idea had seriously decreased in the 
eyes of competing non-Serbian elites.
15
 
 
The Royal Dictatorship (1929-1935) 
 
On 6 January 1929 King Aleksandar dissolved parliament and installed a Royal Dictatorship, 
the ultimate goal of which was to preserve Yugoslav national unity. As the king put it in his 
declaration:  
 
Instead of developing and strengthening the spirit of national and state unity, parliamentarism – such as 
it is – is beginning to lead to spiritual disintegration and to national disunity. It is My sacred duty to 
employ all means to preserve State and National unity. And I have resolved to fulfill this duty without 
hesitation to the end. To preserve national unity, and the integrity of the state, that is the highest goal of 
My Reign, and that must be the greatest law for Me and for everyone. (Qtd. and translated in Nielsen 
124)  
 
King Aleksandar appointed a Council of Ministers and within a short period of time a large 
amount of new laws were adopted in order to sanction integral Yugoslavism as the official 
state ideology.
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 The Law on the Protection of Public Security and Order in the State forbade 
all political parties or organizations that were based on religious or tribal characteristics. Only 
organizations which adopted the official national ideology of integral Yugoslavism were 
permitted (Kingdom of SCS, ―Zakon o zaštiti‖ art. 3). The new Law on the Press forbade all 
publications that spread hatred against the state as a unity, or any form of tribal or religious 
discord (Kingdom of SCS, ―Zakon o izmenama‖ art. 3). A Central Press Bureau was installed 
to check domestic and foreign publications (Kingdom of SCS, ―Zakon o presbirou‖). The 
most important law in this respect was the Law on the Name and Division of the Kingdom in 
Administrative Regions. From then on the state was called Kingdom of Yugoslavia and was 
divided in 9 administrative regions, called banovine (plural, the singular form is banovina), 
while the city of Belgrade and its surroundings formed a separate administrative unit 
(Kingdom of SCS, ―Zakon o nazivu‖ arts. 1-4).17 According to the regime, the boundaries of 
the new banovine were drawn in correspondence to natural, economic and communicative 
factors. They replaced ―historical boundaries, those obstacles to our national formation and 
development‖ by ―strong and viable administrative and economic units.‖18 The new name of 
the state ―not only reflect[ed] the complete unity of our state and nation but also symbolically 
express[ed] the idea of full similarity, equality and brotherhood of us, Slavs of the South, 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.‖19 Equally important for national unification was the foundation 
of the Sokol of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
20
 The Sokol replaced all previously existing, 
tribal youth gymnastics movements ―to raise physically healthy, morally strong and nationally 
conscious citizens of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia‖ (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Statut‖ art. 1).21  
This short overview of the legislation policy during the first year of the dictatorship 
clarifies to what extent integral Yugoslavism was endorsed as the official national ideology in 
legislation. However, how did the regime define this Yugoslav national identity? King 
Aleksandar‘s inauguration speech to the new National Parliament on 18 January 1932 
provides us with one of the clearest formulations of the official national idea.
22
 Accordingly, 
the Yugoslavs had settled in the Balkans as a homogeneous nation. External factors had led to 
the separation of the Yugoslav nation into three tribes, but differences between them were 
only superficial and ―in the end, the ethnical truth of the Yugoslav idea came across all the 
obstacles that were artificially formed throughout the centuries‖ (KaraĎorĎević 1). However, 
the formation of a Yugoslav nation-state in 1918 had not immediately brought national 
unification, since political passions had led to chaos and division in the twenties. Only after 6 
January 1929 the ethnical truth of integral Yugoslavism was fully realized (KaraĎorĎević 
passim). Thus, the King did not completely deny tribal traditions, but claimed that the 
complete assimilation of all three tribes into one nation had been realized on 6 January 1929.  
 The regime tried to spread Yugoslav national consciousness among the population in 
several ways. In the political sphere, a new Constitution was adopted on 3 September 1931. 
The King remained the dominant political factor, but a semi-parliamentary system was 
installed and the people were invited to cooperate with the King in his Yugoslav project 
through semi-democratic elections. The Constitution and election laws made sure that only 
parties that supported integral Yugoslavism and enjoyed the support of the new political elite 
could take part in the elections, and that the party that won the elections would surely 
dominate the parliament. Indeed, the only candidates participating in the elections of 8 
November 1931 were on the governmental list headed by Ţivković. The turnout of 66% was 
interpreted as a confirmation of the public‘s satisfaction with the new regime. After the 
success of the elections attempts were made to form a mass political participation platform in 
the Yugoslav spirit. On 15 December 1931 the Deputies‘ Club of the National Parliament 
accepted a mutual political program and on 18 December 1931 the Yugoslav Radical Peasant 
Democracy (JRSD, Jugoslovenska radikalno-seljačka demokratija) was formed. The party 
was renamed into Yugoslav National Party (JNS, Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka) on 21 
July 1933 (Dobrivojević 122-34; Nielsen 385-414; Stojkov, Opozicija 133-43). Party 
members organized gatherings all over the country in order to create a Yugoslav national 
movement that would organize ―the people in the spirit expressed in all the important acts 
since 6 January 1929.‖23 The official party program adopted at the party congress of 20-21 
July 1933 started with a clear formulation of its integral Yugoslav ideology:  
 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes form one unified Yugoslav nation because they have lived on one cohesive 
territory, because of their equal geographic and ethnographic structure, by their origin, by their 
language, by their century-long aspirations, by the sameness of their historical destiny and experiences, 
by their never extinguishing consciousness and community. Therefore Yugoslav national unity is an 
irrefutable and natural fact.  
The national thought in every national part during our entire national past has in reality always been 
Yugoslav, because it was identical, although it has been expressed and named in different ways. By 
means of the liberation and the voluntarily realized unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in one 
indivisible national state - based on the fundaments of the self-determination of nations –  the Yugoslav 
national idea forever became the one and only mark of national unity and the fundament of all national 
life, the one and only exclusive national idea, the guiding principle of the entire Yugoslav nation.  
The equal and harmonious efforts of our entire unified nation have to lead to the preservation, 
development and assimilation of all cultural, economic and social inheritances, which were obtained in 
separate pasts, into a general and common national good. In addition, new heritages have to be acquired 
in the future and the national unity in the harmony of all our authentic properties has to be constantly 
strengthened and enhanced. (―Načele‖ 2-3) 
 
Apart from the mobilization of the masses in a mass political movement, the regime 
also tried to spread integral Yugoslav national consciousness through education reforms. 
What Minister of Education Boţidar Maksimović said for primary education, that its goal was 
―not only to spread literacy, but also, even more, to educate nationally,‖24 counted for the 
entire education system. As the daily Jugoslovenski dnevnik wrote: ―all […] educational 
institutions first of all have to serve the idea of national unity and the development of the 
Yugoslav ideology‖ (―Za uspešno sprovoĎenje‖ 1).25 Thus, in the course of 1929 and 1930 the 
Ministry of Education adopted a series of laws, which were intended to unify the education 
system in the Yugoslav national spirit. Also, new curriculums were issued in the place of the 
several curriculums that were used in the different historical regions before 1929. Arguably 
the most important of these curriculums was the 1933 curriculum for elementary schools. As 
in other curriculums that were adopted during the dictatorship the so-called national courses, 
i.e. literature/grammar, history and geography received much attention, since these were the 
courses where pupils were taught what it meant to be a Yugoslav and could develop their 
Yugoslav national consciousness (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Metodska uputstva‖ 3).26 One of 
the main goals of the literature/grammar lessons was ―to develop the student‘s consciousness 
of national unity and national pride‖ (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Nastavni plan i program za 
osnovne škole‖ 1). Serbian and Croatian were considered as one Serbo-Croatian language. On 
15 June 1929 the Ministry of Education issued orthographic instructions for all schools in 
Yugoslavia. The new orthography had been written by a commission under the leadership of 
the leading Serbian linguist of the period, Aleksandar Belić, and had to be used in education 
all over Yugoslavia. In addition, all textbooks had to be written in accordance to the new 
orthographic rules (Kingdom of SCS, ―Pravopisno uputstvo‖ 2). Students had to learn both 
the Latin and the Cyrillic alphabet.
27
 Reading books should include extracts from authors 
from all the historical regions in Yugoslavia. In Slovenia the Serbo-Croatian language was 
taught one hour per week and one fourth of the texts in reading books should be in Serbo-
Croatian (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Nastavni plan i program za osnovne škole‖ 1-3). In 
geography courses students should ―get to know their fatherland and develop patriotic love 
toward it‖ (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Metodska uputstva‖ 29). Banovine were intended to 
become the primary regional spaces of identification. Pupils first learned about their own 
banovina and then about Yugoslavia; no longer were they part of a Slovenian, Serbian or 
Croatian region (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Nastavni plan i program za osnovne škole‖ 4-5). 
In history courses pupils should learn about the history of the Yugoslav nation. In practice, 
Yugoslav history was presented as the history of a nation that, after its arrival in the Balkans, 
was separated into three tribes by external enemies. All of these tribes fought against the 
enemy in order to re-unite and liberate their co-nationals in one Yugoslav nation-state. This 
ideal was realized after the First World War and on 6 January 1929. Events that are now 
generally considered to be part of the national history of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, 
Montenegrins, Bosniaks or Macedonians were interpreted as parts of a common Yugoslav 
history. For example, history courses downplayed religious differences within Yugoslavia and 
stressed the common, Slavic character of the conversion to Christianity, not only for Orthodox 
regions, where this was generally accepted, but also for Catholics by pointing at Grgur Ninski 
and the reformation movement, both favoring the use of the Slavic vernacular for liturgy and 
religious writings.
28
 The battle of Kosovo was interpreted as a battle of all Yugoslavs against 
the Turks. All of the medieval empires were interpreted as attempts to unify all Yugoslavs, 
King Tvrtko I being the first to realize the dream of Yugoslav unification.
29
 The Yugoslav 
renaissance of the 19
th
 century was seen as a joint project of all three tribes: Serbia had Prince 
Mihailo Obrenović, Croatia had Josip Strossmayer, and Slovenia Janez Bleiweis.30 The 
creation of the Yugoslav state and the new political structure after 6 January 1929 were seen 
as the final steps toward the realization of the age-old Yugoslav dream (Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, ―Nastavni plan i program za osnovne škole‖ 5-7).31  
 If we take these declarations, political programs and curriculums as the most concrete 
formulations of the ruling elite‘s Yugoslav national ideology, we clearly see that it was 
conceived of as a synthesis of the different tribal traditions. From each of the tribes national 
ideologists selected those symbolic resources that could be interpreted in a Yugoslav way and 
detached them from their tribal interpretation. However, there was still a slight predominance 
of Serbian symbolic resources in this integral Yugoslav identity. According to the curriculum 
of 1933, the history courses in the third grade of elementary school – the first year of history 
education – should provide an introduction in Yugoslav national history through the 
biographies of 10 historical figures. Eight of them were part of the Serbian history, only two 
belonged to the Croatian and none to the Slovenian set of symbolic resources.
32
 But even if 
there was a slight predominance of Serbian symbolic resources, these resources were re-
interpreted as Yugoslav national symbols. For the fourth grade, where a more detailed 
overview of Yugoslav history was envisaged, there was no predominance of Serbian historical 
elements (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Nastavni plan i program za osnovne škole‖ 5-7).  
Whatever were the specific interests of the elites who constructed this integral 
Yugoslav national identity, one cannot call it a Serbian nationalism in disguise as Bakić does 
(401-08). When looking at the concrete formulations of this Yugoslavism, it is clear that it 
was designed to be a synthesis of Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian symbolic resources into a 
Yugoslav whole. However, the particular way in which the regime applied this national 
ideology very much discredited the idea of Yugoslavism itself. Precisely because the regime 
proclaimed Yugoslavism as the cornerstone of its authoritarian politics, opposition against the 
regime was also expressed as opposition against Yugoslavism. The Yugoslav idea, which had 
previously been a progressive idea, popular among intellectual circles in all parts of 
Yugoslavia and certainly not incompatible with Slovenianism, Croatianism or Serbianism, 
was more and more interpreted as a conservative, authoritarian, anti-national idea. That way, 
the process whereby Yugoslavism lost ground and other national ideas available in 
Yugoslavia gained significance as ideas providing viable alternatives for the regime‘s 
Yugoslavism – a process that had already been underway in the parliamentary period – only 
gathered momentum during the Royal Dictatorship.   
On October 9, 1934 King Aleksandar was assassinated by Croatian and Macedonian 
terrorists during an official visit to France. The whole country was in shock. The government 
attempted to present Aleksandar as martyr for the Yugoslav national case, and the king‘s 
alleged last words ―Save my Yugoslavia‖ were spread all over the country as the guiding 
principle for generations to come (Djokić, ―(Dis)Integrating Yugoslavia‖ 136-37; Nielsen 
454-62). It soon became clear, however, that Aleksandar‘s death had left the ruling political 
elite without any legitimacy. At the May 1935 elections the governmental list headed by 
Prime Minister Bogoljub Jevtić managed to gain only a slight majority of the votes, despite 
the highly favorable election law. The large number of votes for the Joint Opposition, 
consisting of the major pre-1929 parties (Radicals and SLS not included), convinced Prince-
Regent Pavle that Jevtić enjoined very little actual support and that he would be incapable to 
solve the increasingly urgent Croatian question. Pavle then invited Milan Stojadinović, 
Finance Minister in Jevtić‘s government and former member of the Radical Party, to form a 
new government (Stojkov, Vlada 7-11). This meant the actual end of the Royal Dictatorship 
of King Aleksandar and of integral Yugoslavism as its official national ideology.    
 
Stojadinović’s government (1935-1939) 
 
Stojadinović formed a government, which consisted of politicians formerly affiliated with the 
Radical Party, the Slovenian People‘s Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization 
Stojadinović gradually abandoned integral Yugoslavism in favor of what historians have 
termed real Yugoslavism (Dimić 1: 329-95).33 The clearest formulation of this real 
Yugoslavism can be found in the 1935 program of the Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ, 
Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica), the new ruling party consisting of a group of Radicals 
supporting Stojadinović, SLS and JMO. The party explicitly dissociated itself from JNS 
integralists who, in their view, had only aggravated the Croatian question. Indeed, the party 
intended to fully solve the Croatian question, not in an authoritarian way, but in an 
atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation. Thus, the party‘s explicit recognition of tribal 
differences can only be understood as a reaction against the authoritarian character of the 
previous regime and its integral Yugoslav ideology.   
 
[T]he territories our state consists of have lived their own particular lives and have obtained separate 
administrative, political and other habits over a long period of time. In order to develop and strengthen 
the consciousness of the unity of our state and our nation, and to equalize and reduce the differences our 
long and unequal past bequeathed us as good and wise as possible, the Party considers that the only 
political method to do so is to work gradually and sensibly, not to use outdated methods and not to try to 
create new feelings that way. Respect for the three names of our nation – Serb, Croat and Slovene – and 
their equality, respect for traditions, all that has to be protected, because that way the people will 
develop mutual respect, trust and consideration. (Qtd. in Stojkov, Vlada 54-55)  
 
Thus, unlike integral Yugoslavists, who claimed that historical differences were only 
superficial and of no importance for Yugoslav national unity, and Radicals in the twenties, 
who adopted a – from a nationalist point of view – somehow hybrid national ideology, which 
accepted the existence of a Yugoslav nation but at the same time acknowledged tribal 
differences within that nation, JRZ adopted an ideology of a gradual synthesis of all positive 
tribal characteristics into one Yugoslav (supra-)nation.
34
 As mentioned in its program the 
party intended ―to strengthen the harmony between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as much as 
possible, to nurse the idea of Yugoslavism, of the Yugoslav totality as a synthesis of all 
positive characteristics and creative forces of all parts of the Yugoslav nation‖ (qtd. in Dimić 
1: 337-38). For JRZ, Yugoslavism was something for the future. The present reality, hence 
the name real Yugoslavism, was that different tribal traditions had to be recognized and 
respected.  
 In practice this meant that Stojadinović saw his party and government as the 
representatives of three parts of the Yugoslav nation, each of them with sufficient autonomy 
toward their own region: Slovenes under SLS representatives, Bosnian Muslims under JMO 
politicians and Serbs under Stojadinović‘s Radicals.35 A next step would be for the Croats too 
to have their representatives in government (Stojadinović 317-22, 498-99).36 Indeed, 
Stojadinović made attempts to reach an agreement with the Croatian Peasant Party, and 
although it can be discussed to which extent Stojadinović genuinely favored such an 
agreement, it is clear that his government recognized the urgency of the Croatian question 
(Djokić, Elusive Compromise 115-18; Stojadinović  465-70). 37 
What is more striking for the argument of this article is that in the discourse of 
Stojadinović and his ruling elite much less attention was paid to Yugoslavism in comparison 
to the twenties and certainly to the period of the Royal Dictatorship. Whereas in previous 
periods Yugoslavism had taken a prominent place in the elites‘ national discourse, it appeared 
only seldom in Stojadinović‘s discourse. What is more, JRZ openly criticized the integral 
Yugoslavism of the dictatorial regime for denying the existence of Serbian, Croatian and 
Slovenian nationalisms. In the words of JRZ Senator Dragoslav ĐorĎević ―the danger for this 
state lies not in Serbianism, Croatianism or Slovenianism, not in Serbian, Croatian or 
Slovenian nationalism‖ but in ―the new, bookish, doctrinarian, anemic and abstract Yugoslav 
nationalism, which denies Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian nationalism‖ (qtd. in Bakić 360). 
In a speech in parliament Stojadinović agreed with ĐorĎević that ―we are one nation and [at 
the same time] we are not one nation‖ (qtd. in Bakić 360). However, what really mattered for 
Stojadinović was that the Croats were satisfied in Yugoslavia, just like the Serbs and the 
Slovenes (Bakić 360-361).  
Consequently, the new government intended to loosen some of the integral Yugoslav 
elements of cultural politics under the dictatorship. This did not mean that JRZ radically broke 
with the integral Yugoslav cultural politics of the dictatorship. The curriculums that were 
adopted during the dictatorship remained valid and the few new curriculums that were issued 
did not differ from the previous ones. For example, the new curriculum for civil schools, 
which was adopted in 1936, prescribed the familiar approach toward Yugoslav history.
38
 For 
literature courses the students should read extracts from writers from the different historical 
regions in Yugoslavia as part of a larger Yugoslav literature (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 
―Nastavni plan i program za I, II, III i IV razred graĎanskih škola‖ passim). However, as 
Dragoslav ĐorĎević made clear in a Senate speech about history textbooks clarifies, the 
governmental party adhered to a different interpretation of the Yugoslav national identity:  
 
Our history textbooks should contain the histories of Croats, Slovenes and Serbs, and not the history of 
Yugoslavia, because the history of Yugoslavia, in its literal and wider meaning, not in its widest and 
most extreme version, only begins in 1918. In those textbooks Tomislav, Kresimir, Petar Svačić, Matija 
Gubec and their equals should not be Yugoslav, but Croatian kings, giants and martyrs. Prešern, Cankar 
and others should be freely called Slovenian giants. Let the Nemanjići, KaraĎorĎe and Miloš be Serbian 
and not Yugoslav kings, tsars, giants and martyrs. Let the heroic army at Kumanovo be a Serbian and 
not a Yugoslav army et cetera. Historical facts should not be hidden, history should not be falsified in 
our textbooks! (Qtd. in Dimić 1: 353-54) 
 
Indeed, in 1938 Education Minister Dimitrije Magarašević issued a new decree that allowed 
the use of textbooks that focused on the specific cultural spheres within the country and not so 
much on the integrality of Yugoslav culture (Dimić 1: 376-77). Interior Minister Korošec also 
took measures against integral Yugoslav organizations. The Sokol for example, one of the 
pillars of the dictatorship‘s cultural politics, gradually lost its privileged position, especially in 
Dravska banovina (Ţutić, Sokoli 103-226).39 
The Yugoslav national idea gradually disappeared from the political and cultural scene 
and its impact as a factor in the dynamic model of Yugoslav national identities decreased. 
That would become even more the case in the period after the formation of a new government 
in 1939, when a separate Croatian banovina was created with effective autonomy (Dimić 1: 
396-424; Djokić, Elusive Compromise 171-222). In practice, Yugoslavism as a national idea 
lost ground. Only the concept of several national parts within a Yugoslav multi-national state 
unity remained viable.          
 
Conclusion 
 
During all three periods of political rule under scrutiny, the national ideology of the ruling 
elites was essentially Yugoslav in character. All three ruling political elites I have discussed, 
accepted the existence or desirability of a Yugoslav nation to some extent. Contrary to the 
views of scholars as Banac or more recently Bakić, I have tried to show that the Yugoslavism 
of the ruling elites cannot be reduced to a merely tactical choice to protect Serbian national 
interests. This is not to say that regional/tribal/national interests played no role whatsoever in 
the dynamic formulation of Yugoslav national identities and ideologies. It is to say, that even 
when Serbian, Croatian or Slovenian interests acted as interpretive lenses in the dynamics of 
national identity, the end product could be Yugoslavism. It is only if one supposes national 
identities to be fixed and singular matters that every Yugoslavism has to be perceived through 
the lenses of today‘s dominant national ideologies and identities, as Serbian, Croatian or 
Slovenian nationalism in disguise.   
Agreeing with Wachtel that ―although political and social disagreements threatened 
the stability of the first Yugoslav state, its real failure was its inability to create a consensus 
regarding the twin concepts of the Yugoslav nation and its culture‖ (68), I have focused on the 
failure of ruling political elites to reach a consensus regarding the Yugoslav national idea as a 
framework within which the Yugoslav national identity could be elaborated on by a wider 
range of political and cultural elites. Although, as noted before, at the beginning of the period 
some form of Yugoslavism was accepted by governmental as well as opposition parties, 
ruling elites failed to create incentives for further interactive, negotiated and dynamic re-
definitions of Yugoslav national identity. As Bulatović puts it: ―Even if we assume that a new 
multi-ethnic Yugoslav identity was as achievable as any other, that process would require a 
longer, much better organized and more systematic process of ‗imagination‘ and ‗invention‘‖ 
(268). As we have seen, in the discourse on education policy Yugoslavism took a prominent 
place throughout the period. However, during the twenties, no actual reforms were carried out 
toward the creation of a unified Yugoslav cultural space through education reforms, although, 
as Wachtel has shown, in the cultural arena there was considerable support and creativity to 
accomplish such a cultural unification (67-127). During the Royal Dictatorship, several 
measures were taken toward a Yugoslavization of the education system. However, the 
authoritarian nature of the regime quickly caused animosity toward Yugoslavism as a national 
idea itself, since that idea was so fundamental and omnipresent in the discourse of the 
dictatorial regime. Moreover, the intolerance toward political and cultural options other than 
the official version of integral Yugoslavism and centralism left little room for negotiation and 
interaction, basic traits of all successful national identities.
40
 Consequently, the rich Yugoslav 
national idea, which had been popular among educated circles all over Yugoslavia, became 
linked to conservatism, centralism, authoritarianism and for non-Serbian elites increasingly to 
Serbian hegemony.
41
 Yugoslavism on the one and Serbianism, Croatianism or Slovenianism 
on the other became increasingly perceived as competing, opposing national ideas within the 
framework of the Yugoslav state. When the dictatorial regime lost its legitimacy after 
Aleksandar‘s death, Yugoslavism as a national idea gradually lost ground. It only survived as 
the idea of a multinational state.  
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1
 See for example Gligorijević (―Jugoslovenstvo‖); Pavlović; Suppan; Ţutić (―Ideologija jugoslovenstva‖). This 
article will not mention Montenegrin, Bosniak or Macedonian national identities, since during the interwar 
period the ruling political elites I focus on did not consider them constituent parts of the Yugoslav nation. It 
should however be argued that the interwar period was of great importance for the development of these national 
identities.    
2
 Indeed, throughout his book Djokić hints at the dynamic and overlapping character of Yugoslav, Serbian and 
Croatian national ideas, suggesting that ―it is debatable whether Serbian and Croatian nationalisms had been 
formed by 1918, and whether they remained immune to evolution following the creation of Yugoslavia‖ (Elusive 
Compromise 7).  
3
 This typology of Yugoslavism draws on the one which was suggested by Dimić (1: 191-395) and later adopted 
by Bakić (85-86). Bakić has categorized the national ideologies of both the Radicals in the twenties and the 
government of Stojadinović as real Yugoslavism. In order to make a clear distinction between both periods, I 
have opted for the term compromised Yugoslavism for the first period, following Dimić who has termed the 
national idea of the ruling elites during the twenties ―compromised national unitarism‖ (1: 213).   
4
 In March 1924 a branch of the Democratic Party formed an Independent Democratic Party (SDS, Samostalna 
demokratska stranka) under the leadership of Svetozar Pribićević. Independent Democrats disagreed with the 
Democrats‘ more tolerant position toward a decentralization of Yugoslavia. However, both parties remained 
advocates of Yugoslavism (Gligorijević, Parlament 159-62). 
5
 King Aleksandar‘s vision on the Yugoslav national question will be discussed in the following section.  
6
 The Radical Party was formed in the eighties of the nineteenth century in independent Serbia. After the 1903 
coup it became the country‘s dominant party (Gligorijević, Parlament 7-10). 
7
 During the interwar period the term ―tribe‖ (pleme) was commonly used to denote the Serbian, Croatian and 
Slovenian branch of the Yugoslav nation. This makes clear to which extent the notion of a Yugoslav nation was 
accepted by the political elites of the period. At the same time, however, it clarifies that differences within the 
Yugoslav nation had to be addressed somehow and could not be simply ignored. Throughout this article, the 
terms tribe and tribal will be used solely in this meaning.  
8
 The quotation is from Samouprava, the official newspaper of the Radicals. All translations in this paper are 
mine, except when noted otherwise. 
9
 This overlap between Yugoslavism and ―narrow‖ national ideas was not only characteristic of the Radicals. 
There can be no place here for a detailed overview of all political parties in Yugoslavia, but suffice it to refer to 
the examples Djokić provides of the overlap of Yugoslav and Croatian national ideas in the discourse of Stjepan 
Radić, the leader of the Croatian (Republican) Peasant Party (H(R)SS, Hrvatska (republikanska) seljačka 
stranka) (Elusive Compromise esp. 29-30, 31-35, 51-53). The same point can be made for two other parties that 
frequently joined government, the Slovenian People‘s Party (SLS, Slovenska ljudska stranka) and the Yugoslav 
Muslim Organization (JMO, Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija) (Banac 340-51, 359-77).  
10
 Articles 2 and 3 of the 1921 Constitution (MrĎenović 209). 
11
 Article 16: ―All schools have to provide moral education and develop civic consciousness in the spirit of 
national unity and religious tolerance‖ (MrĎenović  211). 
12
 A first curriculum was adopted in June 1925, but was never implemented. It was replaced by a new curriculum 
on 9 August 1926. Due to severe criticism this curriculum was again replaced by a temporary curriculum in 
October 1927. However, the differences between these curriculums were actually negligible (Dimić 2: 121; 
Mayer 72). 
13
 See Bakić (298-348, 363-401) and Banac (153-189). 
14
 As already mentioned, this point could also be made for other political elites of the period.  
15
 For the Yugoslav ideologies of both centralist and decentralist parties during and right after the First World 
War, see Djokić (Elusive Compromise 12-75). For cultural Yugoslavism during the interwar period, see Wachtel 
(67-127). The decreasing popularity of Yugoslavism during the twenties was most obvious among non-Serbian 
elites and was expressed as opposition against Serbian hegemony. Serbian elites remained more favorable 
toward Yugoslavism, and it was only by the end of the interwar period that disillusion with Yugoslavism as a 
national idea grew among Serbian elites too.   
16
 The Council of Ministers consisted mostly of dissident politicians affiliated with the formally forbidden 
Radical and Democratic Party. The King also tried to include representatives of other tribes in his government. 
                                                                                                                                                        
SLS leader Anton Korošec became Minister of Traffic until he broke with the regime in 1930. Later, in 
September 1931, the government was joined by two Slovenian integral Yugoslavists: Albert Kramer, former 
member of the Democratic Party, and Ivan Pucelj, former leader of the Independent Agrarian Party (SKS, 
Samostojna kmetijska stranka). Throughout the dictatorship the government also included several Croatian 
representatives, mostly HSS dissidents, and some Bosnian JMO dissidents. General Petar Ţivković became the 
first prime minister (Nielsen 127-32; Stojkov, Opozicija 72-109, 133-43).  
17
 Dravska banovina corresponded to Slovenia, Savska and Primorska to Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, the six 
other banovine (Dunavska, Vrbaska, Drinska, Moravska, Vardarska and Zetska) had a Serbian majority, again an 
indication of Serbian dominance. All banovine except Primorska (Coastal) were named after rivers (Djokić 
Elusive Compromise 72-74).  
18
 Governmental declaration presented by Petar Ţivković at the XXI session of the Council of Ministers, 4 July 
1930 (Dimić, Ţutić and Isailović 193). 
19
 Petar Ţivković at the XXIII session of the Council of Ministers, 3 October 1929 (Dimić, Ţutić and Isailović 
100). 
20
 The Sokol (Czech, literally ‗falcon‘) was a youth gymnastics movement with a specific tradition in the Slavic 
world. The first Sokol was founded in 1862 in Prague by Miroslav Tyrš. It was not only a gymnastics movement, 
but also an organization through which the nation was nationally educated. Later, similar movements were 
established in other Slavic lands, all combining gymnastics with national education. In the Yugoslav lands a 
Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian and Yugoslav Sokol were founded, all of which were disbanded and replaced by 
the Sokol of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 (Ţutić, Sokoli 5-80).   
21
 For more details on the consolidation of the dictatorship see Dobrivojević (44-59, 95-122) and Nielsen (123-
239).  
22
 On 3 September 1931 the King installed a semi-parliamentary system. I deal with this more extensively in the 
following paragraph.  
23
 Petar Ţivković at the XXIII meeting of the Council of Ministers on 25 August 1930 (Dimić, Ţutić and 
Isailović 200). Famously, a party rally in Niš in April 1933 ended in complete chaos because of the rain and the 
very large number of people using the free train tickets the regime offered for the occasion as a unique 
opportunity to visit Niš rather than to express their support for the regime (Dobrivojević 131-32).  
24
  VI session of the Council of Ministers, 14 March 1929 (Dimić, Ţutić and Isailović 35). 
25
 Jugoslovenski dnevnik was a daily appearing from 1929 until 1935, first in Subotica and later in Novi Sad, 
under the redaction of integral Yugoslav publicist and politician Fedor Nikić.  
26
 Not surprisingly, religious instruction was closely checked by the state, since religion was considered to be the 
most important factor of division within the Yugoslav nation. Religion teachers stood under the strict supervision 
of the authorities at the level of the banovine. Curriculums for religious instruction were issued by the Ministry 
of Education. In both cases the different religious authorities could only act as advisory organs. Students‘ 
organizations could not be based on religious or tribal factors. Outside school, religious organizations were 
permitted, but only for cherishing religious sentiments (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ―Zakon o verskoj nastavi‖ 
passim).   
27
 The orthographic instructions stated that ―[i]n the Serbo-Croatian literary language both alphabets, Latin and 
Cyrillic, are equal (Kingdom of SCS, ―Pravopisno uputstvo‖ 3).‖ Indeed, we see that Yugoslav orientated 
publications, such as Jugoslovenski Dnevnik or Almanah Kraljevine Jugoslavije (‗Almanac of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia‘), used the Latin and Cyrillic alphabet alternately. 
28
 Grgur Ninski was bishop in Nin in present-day Croatia in the 10
th
 century. He supported the use of Old 
Slavonic as the language for liturgy. 
29
 Tvrtko I Kotromanić (1353-1391) was the ruler of a kingdom consisting of present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
as well as parts of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro.  
30
 Mihailo Obrenović was Prince of Serbia between 1839-1842 and again between 1860-1868, and favored 
political cooperation between the South Slavs, under his leadership. Bleiweis was a Slovenian publicist who 
founded a journal favoring South Slavic cooperation in 1843.  
31
 It should be mentioned that this Yugoslav interpretation of South Slav historical events was not completely 
new. The interpretation of the Kosovo myth as a Yugoslav myth for example was already well established 
through the work of Ivan Meštrović at the beginning of the 20th century (Wachtel 53-59). 
32
 These were the 10 figures, with their tribal affiliation: Cyrillus and Methodius (commemorated by Orthodox 
and Catholics, although through the use of the Cyrillic alphabet and Old Slavonic in liturgy more closely linked 
with the Serbian tribe), St Sava (Serbian), Prince Marko (Serbian), prince Lazar (Serbian), Nikola Šubić Zrinjski 
(Croatian), KaraĎorĎe (Serbian), Strossmayer (Croatian), King Petar (Serbian), King Aleksandar (Serbian).  
33
 Bakić applies the term real Yugoslavism for both the Radicals in the twenties and Stojadinović‘s government 
(298-363). I have opted not to do so in order to make a clear distinction between the Radicals in the twenties, 
who claimed that tribal differences did not harm Yugoslav national unity, and Stojadinović‘s government, which 
                                                                                                                                                        
held that the Yugoslav national unity could only be fully realized in the future, through mutual respect and 
cooperation between the Yugoslav tribes. I elaborate on this point in the following paragraphs.  
34
 I placed ―supra-‖ in parentheses because it is not clear whether JRZ envisaged a complete assimilation of the 
three tribes into a Yugoslav nation or a harmonic cooperation of three nations within one supranational 
community. For more examples of how Stojadinović‘s discourse included both Yugoslav and tribal elements, see 
Djokić (Elusive Compromise 173-81).  
35
 Especially Slovenia (Dravska banovina) was said to form a state within the state under the undisputed 
leadership of Anton Korošec (Dimić 1: esp. 349-52).   
36
 Stojadinović compared his government to a three-legged chair and stated that his government would not be 
completely stabile until a fourth, Croatian leg was included (Stojadinović 318). 
37
 Stojadinović and Maček met once in January 1937 but failed to reach a concrete agreement (Stojadinović 465-
70). Apparently, Maček preferred to negotiate with Prince Pavle, with whom he met in June 1935 and November 
1936 (Djokić, Elusive Compromise 118). 
38
 Civil schools could be attended by students who had finished lower elementary school and provided technical 
education in three specific directions: trade, industry and agriculture.   
39
 Dravska banovina comprised largely Slovene lands.  
40
 For a stimulating elaboration on the negotiated character of national identities, see Applegate (esp. 1174-79).  
41 Indeed, Serbian politicians dominated Yugoslav governments throughout the interwar period. Consequently, 
Serbian symbolic resources were overrepresented in their definitions of Yugoslavism and there was too little 
space for non-Serbian views on Yugoslavism. It should be stressed however that a majority of the Serbian elites 
too became disillusioned with Yugoslavism by the end of the interwar period (Bulatović 264-68; Djokić, Elusive 
Compromise 223-68).  
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